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Abstract
Standard foreign direct investment (FDI) theory suggests that falling trade costs
should discourage horizontal FDI. Most FDI is horizontal. Yet, the world witnessed
an FDI boom in 1990s, a period of striking falls in trade barriers. This paper carries out
an empirical analysis with rich, rm-level data on the activities of Swedish multination-
als around the globe in manufacturing sectors from 1987 to 1998 to shed light on this
apparent conict. The analysis is based on the predictions of a recent literature with
an industrial organization (IO) angle: Trade costs have asymmetric e¤ects on foreign
expansion modes. This view posits that falling trade costs encourage entry realized as
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), one of the potential explanations for the conict be-
tween received theory and recent trends in FDI. Empirical results conrm the ndings of
this recent literature and add to it by testing its extensions.
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1 Introduction
Standard foreign direct investment (FDI) theory gets its momentum from the so-called
proximity-concentration trade-o¤. Firms invest overseas when benets of doing so outweigh
the loss of scale economies from serving foreign markets from the home country. A natural
conclusion is that falling trade costs should discourage horizontal FDI. Most FDI is horizontal
not vertical. Yet, the world witnessed an FDI boom in 1990s, a period of striking falls in
trade barriers; hence the paradox.
Neary (2009) provides an excellent discussion of this conict and o¤ers two possible reso-
lutions: First, intra-bloc trade liberalization encourages horizontal FDI in trading blocs since
foreign rms can use one of the member countries as an export-platform to serve the entire
region. Second, the now-dominant way of conducting FDI, cross-border mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&As) increase rather than decrease with falling trade costs. The latter, which I will
call the industrial organization (IO) view from now on, is the central thrust of the current
paper.
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) undertake foreign direct investment in di¤erent for-
mats: Cross-border M&As, greeneld FDI, joint ventures, partial acquisitions, and di¤erent
forms of low-equity commitment such as sales o¢ ces, licensing, research centers, etc. In
this paper, a multinational may enter a host market by acquiring/merging with an already
existing local rm (cross-border M&As) or by establishing a new venture (greeneld FDI).
Alternative is to serve the foreign market with exporting, which could potentially capture
the low-equity modes of foreign expansion.1
In standard FDI theory, greeneld FDI is implicitly assumed as the only way to expand
production in another country. However, recent data show that cross-border M&As have a
more than negligible role in foreign market access by multinational rms. For example, the
share of total M&As in world FDI ows has increased from 52% in 1987 to 83% in 2000 and
then declined for a brief period at the beginning of the new millennium.2 In 2006, FDI ows
reached $880 billion reecting renewed strength in M&A activity, albeit still below the record
value in 2000. For developed countries, where acquisition targets are abundant, the share of
cross-border M&As has risen to nearly 100% in 2000 from 62% in 1987. Yet, cross-border
M&As as a mode of foreign entry have received relatively little attention in the FDI literature
until recently.
In this paper, I investigate empirically the role of trade costs in the entry mode choice of
1Due to lack of data, the gray area between wholly owned operations and exports could not be included in
the analysis in this paper.
2See World Investment Report (2007).
1
MNEs. This is important because di¤erent entry modes have di¤ering degrees of impact on
the inter/intra-rm resource transfers. These transfers cause industrial restructuring which
in turn alters the income distribution in the host country through its e¤ect on factor prices.3
As a result, aggregate welfare may shift at the country level. Considering the massive trade
liberalization waves of recent decades and the dominance of sales of foreign a¢ liates ($25,177
billion in 2006) over global exports ($14,120 billion in 2006), it becomes absolutely necessary
to rethink the e¤ects of freer trade not only on trade ows, but also on the FDI ows channeled
through di¤erent modes of entry with mode-specic consequences for the countries hosting
considerable amounts of FDI.4
This paper contributes to the existing literature by carrying out an empirical analysis with
rich, rm-level data on the activities of Swedish MNEs around the globe in manufacturing
sectors from 1987 to 1998. The analysis is based on the predictions of the IO view about the
role of trade costs on foreign expansion. This view posits that falling trade costs encourage
entry realized as M&As, one of the potential explanations for the conict between received
theory and recent trends in FDI.
First, I o¤er a simple theoretical framework to motivate the empirical analysis. Two
hypotheses are generated: (i) Falling trade costs discourage greeneld FDI and encourage
cross-border M&As and exporting, and (ii) International experience dampens the e¤ect of
trade costs on modes of entry. Trade liberalization increases the FDI undertaken not only
by large, productive and diversied rms but also small, less productive and naive ones, too.
These results lend themselves to empirical testing.
Main innovations present in the empirical part are as follows: First, I include all three
foreign access strategies (cross-border M&As, greeneld FDI and exporting) in the analysis,
which di¤ers from many studies that only include two of the strategies at a time. Second, I
employ a di¤erent denition of horizontal investments. In particular, I use the composition of
a¢ liate sales to single out horizontal investments rather than industry classications. Third,
I apply the multivariate probit model to account for the correlation between di¤erent entry
strategies, which reduces the inconsistency of the estimators signicantly.
Results of the empirical analysis show that falling trade costs increase the likelihood of
cross-border M&As as conjectured by recent studies. Entry mode decision of an MNE is
a complex one and there are many asymmetries involved when it comes to the impact of
trade costs on this decision. First, cross-border M&As and exporting are complements not
3Neary (2007), Bertrand and Zitouna (2006), and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2008) are recent theory papers
focusing on di¤erent aspects of industry restructuring after M&As. See Andrade and Sta¤ord (2004) and
Breinlich (2008) for latest related empirical work.
4See World Investment Report (2007) for the a¢ liate sales and global exports information.
2
substitutes in their response to trade costs. Second, M&As are even more severely a¤ected by
changes in trade costs than exports. Third, rms with bigger size or many foreign a¢ liates
are more immune to changes in trade costs, whereas small, single a¢ liate rms are severely
a¤ected. These results conrm the ndings of the recent literature with an IO angle on the
e¤ects of trade costs on FDI and add to it by testing a number of extensions of this view.
The paper continues as follows: In the next section, I present the background material in
a manner closely related to Neary (2009). In Section 3, I lay out a very simple model and
present the testable hypotheses generated from it. In section 4, I discuss the econometric
analysis. Sections 5 reports the results and I conclude in Section 6.
2 Background
2.1 Horizontal FDI
The theory of horizontal FDI originates from the idea of proximity-concentration trade-o¤.
It is now standard in the FDI literature and needs no extended discussion here.5 The idea is
elegant and simple indeed. Firms serve foreign markets either by exporting or by producing
in that market. When trade costs get higher, exporting becomes more expensive. To avoid
paying high tari¤s, rms choose investing abroad; hence the term tari¤-jumping. Across
time, sectors and space falling trade costs encourage exports over FDI.
There is indeed considerable but not overwhelming econometric evidence for the proximity-
concentration trade-o¤. Brainard (1997) provides support for the tari¤-jumping motive by
using industry level data for U.S. multinationals. She nds that the share of FDI increases
relative to exports the higher the trade barriers; however, she reports the e¤ect being much
weaker in explaining the level of a¢ liate sales and the probability of observing any a¢ liate
sales.
Brainards results in regards to the e¤ects of trade costs on FDI are very similar to the
conclusions of the well-known knowledge capital model (Markusen, 2002). Predictions of this
model over the structure of FDI are highly nonlinear in the relevant country and industry
characteristics. Horizontal multinationals are found to be dominant if countries are similar
in size and relative endowments and if transport costs are high.
5See Markusen (2002, Chapter 2) or Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, Chapter 3) for detailed discussions
of the model.
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2.2 Vertical FDI
The theory of vertical FDI originated by Helpman (1984) postulates that incentives for ver-
tical fragmentation arise from international di¤erences in factor endowments when stages
of production di¤er in their factor intensities. The simplest version of the model assumes
two production stages: headquarter services located in the parent country and production
located in the most protable location. Ignoring the demand in the host country, the rm
can remain domestic and serve its home market from its parent plant.6 It incurs high factor
costs but no trade costs. Alternatively, the rm can engage in FDI and export all its output
back home. In that case, it incurs lower factor costs accompanied by trade costs. In short,
the model presents a tension between factor price di¤erences and trade costs. Lower trade
costs encourage FDI in contrast to the horizontal FDI model.
Turning to empirical evidence, the applications of the knowledge capital model rejects the
vertical model in favor of horizontal one. Examples of studies within this line of literature are
Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001), Markusen and Maskus (2001b) and Blonigen, Davies and
Head (2003). Firm-level studies such as Braconier and Ekholm (2000) and Yeaple (2003b)
present mixed evidence for vertical FDI.
2.3 Export-platform FDI
The idea behind the export-platform FDI is more complex than both the horizontal and
vertical FDI models. Motta and Norman (1996), Neary (2002), Yeaple (2003a), Ekholm,
Forslid and Markusen (2007) and Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006) are just a few studies
addressing the export-platform FDI. This type of FDI is usually taken to refer to a situation
where the output of a foreign a¢ liate is largely exported to a third country rather than sold
in the host country.
Di¤erent from mainstream FDI models, export-platform FDI models include at least three
countries with complex integration strategies. Two countries form a trading bloc lowering the
intra-bloc trade costs. External trade barriers remain more or less the same as before. One
generic result of these models is that intra-bloc trade liberalization encourages horizontal FDI
in trading blocs since foreign rms can use one of the member countries as an export-platform
to serve the entire region.
Head and Mayer (2004) analyze the determinants of location choices by Japanese rms in
Europe. They nd that Japanese FDI in Europe is encouraged by market potential which can
be interpreted evidence for export-platform FDI or agglomeration e¤ects. Blonigen, Davies,
6 If the host country market is not negligible, then there are both horizontal and vertical motives. This
makes the negative impact of trade costs on FDI weaker.
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Waddell and Naughton (2007) report clearer evidence for export-platform FDI by using spa-
tial econometric techniques to measure the distance e¤ects beyond adjacent countries. Among
their ndings is that bigger market size in neighboring countries increases U.S. FDI. Chen
(2009) and Tekin-Koru and Waldkirch (2010) provide additional empirical evidence that re-
gional integration raises FDI in general and export-platform FDI in particular in European
Union and NAFTA countries, respectively.
2.4 Cross-border M&As
In the literature I have discussed so far greeneld FDI is implicitly assumed to be the only way
to expand production in another country. However, recent data show that an overwhelming
majority of overseas investments are in the form of cross-border M&As. In recognition of this
trend, a number of studies drawing on the principles of industrial organization literature have
appeared. This new strand builds market power considerations and e¢ ciency gains through
technological progress and scale economies into an FDI model by explicitly considering cross-
border M&As. Görg (2000) [greeneld vs. M&As], Horn and Persson (2001) [export vs.
M&As], Bjorvatn (2004) [export vs. greeneld vs. M&As], Norbäck and Persson (2004)
[export vs. greeneld vs. M&As] and Tekin-Koru (2009) [export vs. greeneld vs. M&As]
provide theoretical models to this e¤ect. These studies come to a conclusion that high trade
costs do not inevitably induce more FDI. In fact, if anything, trade barriers make cross-border
M&As less likely in these models.
Horn and Persson (2001) show that in an international merger formation game without
greeneld FDI domestic rms have an incentive to merge in the presence of su¢ ciently high
trade barriers in order to prevent international mergers. Norbäck and Persson (2004) conrm
that low greeneld costs and low trade costs induce cross-border acquisitions in a mixed
international oligopoly, where state assets are sold at auction. Similar to these studies,
Tekin-Koru (2009) shows that in the case of cross-border M&As higher tari¤s may act as an
entry barrier by raising the reservation price of the acquisition target which is endogenized
through Nash bargaining.
A natural extension here is the favorable impact of trade liberalization on M&A activity
around the globe. This idea is formalized in Bjorvatn (2004) and Neary (2007). The former is
similar to Horn and Persson in spirit yet the modeling approach and the mechanisms di¤er.
Nearys model, on the other hand, has a unifying approach between the traditional FDI
and IO views. Without cost synergies the pattern of cross-border M&As which results from
economic integration follows that of comparative advantage in the sense that more e¢ cient
rms acquire less e¢ cient foreign rivals. He predicts that cross-border M&As and exports
5
are complements rather than substitutes.
Turning to recent empirical work, Blonigen (2002) investigates the possibility of tari¤-
jumping by using rm level data on antidumping duties. He nds quite modest tari¤-jumping
responses suggesting that tari¤-jumping is only a realistic option for multinational rms from
industrialized countries. Hizjen, Görg and Manchin (2008) provide empirical evidence by
using number of M&As in 19 manufacturing industries in 23 OECD countries for the period
19902001. They distinguish horizontal and non-horizontal M&As and nd that the impact
of trade costs is less negative for horizontal mergers, which they interpret as being consistent
with the tari¤-jumping argument. Breinlich (2008) shows that trade liberalization through
the CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement increased domestic Canadian M&A activity
signicantly whereas there is no robust link between tari¤ reductions and either domestic U.S.
or cross-border M&As.
As we saw there are many ways of explaining the paradox of simultaneous existence of
trade liberalization and increased FDI. This paper attempts to shed light on this seemingly
apparent paradox by providing empirical evidence on the predictions of the IO view.
3 Trade costs and the form of FDIA theoretical framework
In this section I will show that trade barriers can have asymmetric e¤ects on FDI depending
on the mode of entry into a foreign market. First, cross-border M&As can be encouraged
not discouraged by falling trade costs. Second, this e¤ect can be di¤erent for di¤erent types
of multinational rms. To highlight these e¤ects, in what follows I introduce a toy model
of mode of foreign entry in two stages based on Tekin-Koru (2009). In the rst stage, entry
mode decision is made and product market interaction takes place in the second stage. I
will try to trim the model down to its bare essentials, focus on the assumptions and present
results in their simplest forms.
Setting. Consider a potential multinational rm m from the parent country seeking to
determine the optimal mode of serving industry j in host country k with n identical local
rms where n  2: Three foreign market penetration strategies (s) are considered. The
multinational can conduct a greeneld FDI (G), acquire one of the local rms (A) or simply
export (E) to the host.
Marginal cost of production for a representative local rm ` is cs` = c; where c 2 (0; 1)
for 8s 2 fA;G;Eg: Following Blonigen (1997) and Nocke and Yeaple (2007) I assume that
rm m is endowed with rm-specic assets (such as human capital of employees, patents,
blueprints and procedures) which provide an ownership advantage over other potential rms
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and cost savings of  2 (0; c). It is assumed that rm m utilizes its technology to the full
extent in a wholly owned subsidiary and produces at a marginal cost of cGm = c    since
the greeneld FDI o¤ers the most successful internalization of the technology in the rm
as discussed in Caves (2007). In case of an M&A, the marginal cost is cAm = c    where
 2 [0; c=) as in Tekin-Koru (2009). Here, I assume that  = 0, in other words, either the
transferred technology is completely useless or no technology is transferred to the acquired
entity. It is helpful to examine this simple case to highlight the impact of trade costs on the
entry decision which is the main focus of the present paper.7 In essence, the marginal cost of
the acquired entity is the same as the local competitors, cAm = c.
8 In case of exporting there
are added trade costs  2 (0; c), so cEm = c   +  :
The xed costs of production change with the mode of entry also. Zero xed costs are
assumed for the case of exporting. In the case of greeneld FDI, there is a given xed cost
of entry FG; and in the case of M&As the initial sum to be incurred or the acquisition price
FA; is endogenously determined by a simple bargaining process.
We can now state rm ms prots from alternative ways of serving the market:
Am = 
A
m(c ;n  1  )  F
A
Gm = 
G
m(c ; +;n )  F
G (1)
Em = 
E
m(c ; ;+
 ;n )
The signs under arguments indicate that operating prots , are decreasing in own production
and trade costs and the number of rms, and increasing in the production cost savings
provided by the ownership of rm-specic assets.
The foundation of the proximity-concentration trade-o¤ and its entry mode implications
are immediately clear. Higher xed costs favor exporting over greeneld FDI, whereas higher
trade costs favor greeneld FDI over exporting. It is also a result oblivious to the possibility
of a cross-border M&A whose initial cost can be di¤erent for di¤erent levels of trade costs.
Thus, it is worth teasing out the riches that come with an M&A.
Bargaining. In the rst stage of the game, rms m and ` seek to split a total surplus if
7 In case of positive technology transfers, results related to trade costs still hold but the proofs become more
complicated. See Tekin-Koru (2009) for more detail.
8There are two, non-exclusive arguments to defend a zero technology transfer in the case of an M&A. "First,
with acquisitions, the multinational acquires existing assets and inheritsa labor force. Both the machinery
and personnel (workers and management) may not be suitable for the exploitation of the multinationals
assets. Second, the multinational may decide not to deploy its rm specic assets in the host country for the
fear that they may di¤use to competitors, e.g. via personnel movements (as in Siotis 1999). Either one or
both of these motives provide a justication for the multinationals choice to use the existing technology in
the host market." (Tekin-Koru, 2009, p.560)
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and only if they agree on a specic division.9 If there is no agreement, then each party would
take up its outside opportunity. When exporting is the best alternative to an M&A form
rm m (max

Em;
G
m
	
= Em), the multinational prefers an M&A if the payo¤ from that is
greater than the payo¤ from exporting. Similarly, when greeneld FDI is the best alternative
to an M&A (max

Em;
G
m
	
= Gm), the multinational prefers an M&A if the payo¤ from
that is greater than the payo¤ from greeneld FDI.
Let FA be proportional to the payo¤ from the outside opportunity, namely the reservation
price of the selling party RA` and inversely proportional to the bargaining strength  2 (0; 1)
of the buying party:
FA =
RA`
(!
+
)
(2)
where
RA` =
8<: 
E
` (c ;  ; +;n ) if max

Em;
G
m
	
= Em
G` (c ;  ;n ) if max

Em;
G
m
	
= Gm
(3)
Notice that the bargaining strength of the multinational increases with its worldwide experi-
ence !. Signicance of international experience in the investment decision of a multinational
is well known in management strategy literature. Starting back with Gatignon and Anderson
(1988) international experience has been cited as an indicator of low levels of internal uncer-
tainty and greater condence in business dealings. Therefore, I assume that multinationals
with more international experience are stronger bargainers and enjoy higher levels of .
Comparative statics. Let me now discuss how trade costs may a¤ect the multinationals
foreign investment decision. It is obvious from expression (1) that greeneld FDI payo¤ Gm
is not a¤ected by a change in trade costs  , whereas exporting payo¤Em declines in  . Thus,
falling trade costs encourage exporting. The e¤ect of trade costs on cross-border M&As is
not immediately clear, however. The following hypotheses can be obtained from this simple
model to illustrate how trade costs may have an asymmetric e¤ect on a multinationals entry
mode decision:
Hypothesis 1 Falling trade costs discourage greeneld FDI and encourage cross-border M&As
and exporting.
The cross-border M&A payo¤ is not a¤ected if the next best alternative to a negoti-
9Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) state that a merger between two rms is not protable in an industry
with more than two identical rms. Neary (2007) shows that unless costs are very similar bilateral mergers are
indeed protable. Tekin-Koru (2009) notices that for rm ` the relevant options are M&As with n  1 rms,
or exports or greeneld FDI with n rms. There is no surplus in the Salant et al. (1983) sense, however, the
alternative to an M&A is to have an additional rm active in the market. Therefore, here I will assume that
bilateral M&As are protable.
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ated agreement is greeneld FDI. However, if exporting is the next best alternative, then
di¤erentiating Am with respect to trade costs  gives
dAm
d
=  dF
A
d
=  d
E
`
d| {z }
+
 1
(!)| {z }
+
< 0 (4)
Notice that the acquisition price FA is proportional to the reservation price of the local
rm RA` . When exporting is the next best alternative to a negotiated agreement, falling
trade costs reduce the protability of the local incumbent in a likely exporting scenario E` .
Hence, the reservation price of the local rm declines. This makes a cross-border M&A a
less expensive choice for the multinational. Therefore, falling trade costs encourage FDI if
it is in the form of an M&A. This result is in line with Horn and Persson (2001), Norbäck
and Persson (2004), Bjorvatn (2004) and Neary (2007). While exporting and greeneld FDI
remain to be substitutes, exporting and cross-border M&As are complements.
Furthermore, if
dE`d   dEmd , then falling trade costs encourage M&As even more so
than exports. This last enunciation holds as long as the local incumbent is more sensitive to
trade costs than the multinational. Indeed this may be the case if the two rms are similarly
productive (low ) and trade costs are not negligible (high ). A major implication of this
result is that broader globalization should promote FDI rather than relegate it.
Hypothesis 2 Falling trade costs induce relatively more M&As by multinationals with less
international experience.
Due to a decline in the reservation price of the acquisition target, falling trade costs
make M&As cheaper for all rms compared to the high trade cost regime. Nevertheless, it is
relatively more so for rms with much less bargaining power. To see this, let us di¤erentiate
expression (4) with respect to !:
d2Am
dd!
=  d
2FA
dd!
=
@E`
@| {z }
+
 @
@!|{z}
+
 1
2|{z}
+
> 0 (5)
Imagine an inexperienced multinational with very low levels of . This will make the
acquisition price FA much higher for this particular rm. Falling trade costs will reduce
the reservation price of the acquisition target. Since the nal acquisition price is inversely
proportional to the bargaining strength of the multinational, relative decline in the acquisition
price will be much more pronounced for this type of rm. All this can be illustrated in (FA; )
space as in Figure 1. It is the isogram of FA and  for di¤erent values of trade costs  : Notice
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Figure 1: International experience, trade costs and M&As
that FA is decreasing in  and lower contours represent falling trade costs. Also notice that
when trade costs decline from 2 to 1; for lower bargaining strengths  = 1 the decline in
FA is much higher compared to the decline for higher bargaining strengths  = 2:
Implications of this hypothesis is clear: Trade liberalization increases the FDI undertaken
not only by large, productive and diversied rms but also small, less productive and naive
ones , too. The results of this section lend themselves to empirical testing and I now turn to
a discussion of the empirical analysis and the dataset.
4 Econometric analysis
The theoretical framework presented in the previous section suggests that trade costs can have
asymmetric e¤ects on di¤erent ways of serving a foreign market. The following econometric
analysis provides the impact of trade costs on foreign entry modes by using a sample of
Swedish multinational rms.
4.1 Econometric model
Hypothesis 1 in the previous section states that trade costs have asymmetric e¤ects on a
multinationals mode of foreign expansion. While greeneld FDI declines with falling trade
costs, cross-border M&As and exporting are encouraged. Put it di¤erently, exporting and
cross-border M&As are complements rather than substitutes. I use the following specication
10
to test these predictions:
yijkt;s = 0;s + 1;s jkt + 
0
2;sxit + 
0
3;sxkt + "ijkt;s (6)
where yijkt;s is a binary indicator if rm is entry into industry j in country k during time
period t in the form of s 2 fA;G;Eg,  jkt denotes trade costs, xit is a vector of rm-specic
variables, and xkt is a vector of country-specic variables. I also include time, industry and
country xed e¤ects in all specications to account for the e¤ect of unobservables.10
Furthermore, under certain circumstances, the impact of trade costs on cross-border
M&As can be more profound than that impact on exporting. To account for the possibility
of a nonlinear relationship, next I add a square term of trade costs in expression (6):
yijkt;s = 0;s + 1;s jkt + 2;s
2
jkt + 
0
3;sxit + 
0
4;sxkt + "ijkt;s (7)
Hypothesis 2 involves more asymmetry. In the face of rapid trade liberalization, less
experienced multinationals conduct relatively more M&As. To test this prediction I include
an interaction term of trade costs and international experience in expression (6):
yijkt;s = 0;s + 1;s jkt + 2;s jkt!it + 
0
3;sxit + 
0
4;sxkt + "ijkt;s (8)
The nested logit model is the most appropriate econometric method to use since the
MNE rst gures out the next best alternative to a negotiated agreement and then enters.
However, the data does not involve any choice specic attributes (variables specic to each
entry mode, such as the cost of M&As or greeneld xed costs), which makes implementing
the nested logit model impossible. Therefore, the paper adheres to the most general setting
where the rm decides if and how to enter.11
Accounting for correlation can be very important in qualitative response models such
as the one in the current study, since controlling for it can reduce the inconsistency of the
estimators signicantly. Hence, the next best econometric model is a multivariate probit
because it allows a exible pattern of conditional covariance among the latent utilities of
alternatives.
Applications of multivariate probit models in higher dimensions have been limited until
10 In a study like the current one, more industry-specic variables would be preferred, in particular a measure
of concentration in industry j in country k during time period t. OECD STAN database o¤ers concentration
measures for a limited number of OECD countries. I used these in my early regressions without much success
due to too many missing observations and small sample sizes.
11At rst a multinomial logit model is employed. Yet, the independence of irrelevant alternatives test has
failed. Results are available upon request.
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recently due to the fact that required integrations of the multivariate normal density over
subsets of Euclidian space are computationally burdensome. However, the development of
the highly accurate Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) probability simulator opened a gate
for the applications. In this paper, the simulated maximum likelihood method using a GHK
simulator is adopted, since it is found to be superior to the other simulation based models in
Geweke, Keane and Runkle (1994).
In this paper, I use both the bivariate probit and the trivariate probit. When the bivariate
probit is used there are two binary variables, yijkt;A and yijkt;G. The MNE has two choices:
A (yijkt;A = 1 and yijkt;G = 0) or G (yijkt;A = 0 and yijkt;G = 1). When the trivariate
probit is used there are three binary variables, yijkt;A, yijkt;G and yijkt;E . The MNE has three
choices: A (yijkt;A = 1, yijkt;G = 0, yijkt;E = 0), G (yijkt;A = 0, yijkt;G = 1, yijkt;E = 0) or E
(yijkt;A = 0, yijkt;G = 0, yijkt;E = 1).
"ijkt;s denotes error terms distributed as multivariate normal, each with a mean of zero,
and variance-covariance matrix V , where V has values of 1 on the leading diagonal and cor-
relations  as o¤-diagonal elements. The model has a structure similar to that of a seemingly
unrelated regression model, except that the dependent variables are binary indicators.
The independence of residuals is tested by using an LR test to explore the existence of
nesting possibilities if any.
4.2 The dependent variable
In this section, I discuss the denition of entry modes used in the empirical setting and provide
detailed information on the dependent variable. The dataset is composed of observations on
the cross-border activities of Swedish MNEs in 42 countries during three distinct time periods:
1987-90, 1991-94 and 1995-98. The choice of countries is determined by the availability of
the trade cost measure and control variables (described in the next section). The rm-level
data used in this study have been collected from a questionnaire sent to Swedish MNEs by
the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (RIIE) in Stockholm, Sweden about every
fourth year since 1970s. The data include all Swedish MNEs in manufacturing industry and
contain detailed information such as employment, production, R&D and entry modes on each
majority owned foreign manufacturing a¢ liate. I use only the most recent years since the
survey questions have changed dramatically over time.
For the present analysis I adopt the denitions of cross-border M&As and greeneld FDI
as in the RIIE survey. More particularly, RIIE asks the following four questions to each foreign
a¢ liate: (1) From what year has the a¢ liate been a production company of the group? (2)
Was the a¢ liate a sales company of the group before the year mentioned above? (3) Did the
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Figure 2: Sale composition of Swedish MNEs: All newly established affiliates,
1987-1998
a¢ liate operate as a production company of another group before the year mentioned above?
(4) Was the a¢ liate a state-owned company before the year mentioned above? If the answers
to last three questions are all negative, then the investment is classied as a greeneld FDI.
If the answer to question 3 is a¢ rmative, then it is a cross-border M&A.12
The theory presented in Section 3 and the IO view refer explicitly to the so-called hori-
zontal FDI: FDI made in order to produce a nal good for sales in the host country. There
are other types of FDI which are ignored in these models such as production in the host
country to export back to the parent country or elsewhere. These can be called vertical and
export platform FDI, respectively. In this paper, I take this di¤erence into account.
Hizjen et al. (2008) also make a distinction between horizontal and non-horizontal merg-
ers. Nevertheless, they do not consider greeneld FDI. They dene horizontal M&As as
mergers between rms within the same industry, whereas non-horizontal M&As as mergers
between rms in di¤erent industries. This is a reasonable way of di¤erentiating; yet, given
that the Swedish data have more detail than industry classications, I use the composition
of a¢ liate sales to single out horizontal investments.
Figure 2 shows the sales composition of Swedish MNEs for all newly established foreign
a¢ liates between 1987 and 1998. On average, 71% of the a¢ liate production is for local
sales, 21% for exports to third countries and 8% for exports back to Sweden. The majority
of investments seem to be horizontal. In Figure 2 vertical FDI is negligible but there is
12The frequency of a¢ liates born from sales companies of the group and the state-owned enterprise acqui-
sitions is low.
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Table 1: Entry characteristics of Swedish MNEs by regions
1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 All periods
A G A G A G A G
Western Europe 107 21 63 16 42 7 212 44
Major Non-European OECD 18 5 9 3 10 2 37 10
Eastern Europe and Russia 0 0 8 8 2 5 10 13
South and Central America 3 0 2 1 6 2 11 3
Asia / Africa 0 0 2 3 8 6 10 9
1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 All periods
Cross-border M&A 128 84 68 280
Greeneld FDI 26 31 22 79
Exporting 1120 1358 902 3380
a noteworthy level of export platform FDI. When the local country is used as an export
platform, it is not clear whether the MNE hurts the local incumbents by entering. If that is
the case, in other words, if the local incumbent is also an exporter to the same third country,
then falling trade costs are expected to reduce the acquisition price as in the horizontal
FDI scenario. Otherwise, the e¤ect of the host country tari¤ on the export platform FDI
is not that clear-cut. Taking all this and the IO theories discussed in Section 2 and 3 into
consideration, I only include newly established a¢ liates for which the share of production for
the local market is more than 75% of their total production.13
Now I turn to entry mode patterns of Swedish MNEs. Table 1 summarizes the number of
foreign entry transactions by Swedish MNEs between 1987 and 1998. I distinguish between
cross-border M&As and greeneld FDI as well as the location of these investments in broad
regional categories. When scrutinizing this table, several remarks can be made. First, as
can be observed in the bottom half of Table 1, in each time period foreign entry is small
when compared to exporting, which is true for an overwhelming majority of MNEs around
the globe. However, among the two entry modes the total number of M&As is substantially
higher than that of greeneld FDI in all three time periods. M&As are almost 4.9 times as
greeneld FDI in 1987-1990, 2.7 times in 1991-1994 and 3.1 times in 1995-1998.
This brings me to my second remark. There is a puzzling, steady decline both in the
number and the relative importance of M&As over the years. Diminishing number of rms
surveyed or survey response rates over the years are the rst two culprits one can think of,
13Results using the entire sample, which are excluded for brevity and available upon request, are very
similar to the ones reported in this paper since horizontal investments dominate the sample. Moreover, since
the likelihood functions were never concave when running estimations with vertical and platform investments
due to small sample sizes, I was not able to get any sensible results for those types of investments.
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however, neither have progressively declined. For example, the number of rms responded
uctuates over the years from 115 to 131 to 97. Ekholm and Hesselman (2000) who wrote the
rst report about the 1998 survey also made the same comment. One plausible explanation is
the possibility of some Swedish MNEs cease to be multinationals and revert back to exporting
due to lower trade costs. Then, they would presumably be no longer in the sample. This
would imply an underestimation of the e¤ect of trade costs on M&A activity. Because the
survey does not involve questions related to exit, this point cannot be adequately addressed.
If anything, this decline in the number of rms and foreign entry should bias results against
the IO view.
Third, observe the top half of Table 1. An overwhelming majority of investments are
in Western Europe followed by major non-European OECD countries. Both M&As and
greeneld FDI in these two regions are higher than all the other regions together. The
common denominator of all these countries is their level of development. As stated in Barba
Navaretti and Venables (2004), FDI goes predominantly to advanced countries, even though
the share of developing countries has been rising. Developed countries o¤er a large and
growing demand coupled with ease of nding sub-contractors and distribution channels all of
which favor entry.
Fourth and last, developed countries supply a higher number of high quality acquisition
targets. Table 1 shows that Swedish MNEs have considerably higher M&As in Western
Europe and major non-European OECD countries. The preferred mode of entry in developing
countries is not as clear, however. The share of greeneld FDI in all entry modes (calculated
by using the last two columns of the top half of Table 1) in developing countries is 45%,
whereas it is only 18% in developed countries.
4.3 Measuring trade costs
In this study I consider two components of trade costs: trade barriers and transportation
costs. The latter is proxied by Distance measured using the great circle formula. This formula
approximates the shape of the earth as a sphere and calculates the minimum distance along
the surface between Sweden and a foreign country. As a measure of transportation costs
I expect it to have a positive impact on M&As and a negative impact on greeneld FDI.
However, distance also proxies for the possibilities of personal contact between managers
and customers and cultural di¤erences across countries. These tend to reduce transfers of
information and the establishment of trust. Therefore, distance may negatively a¤ect all
types of FDI.
Trade barriers measure Tari¤ is constructed by using data from UNCTAD-TRAINS data
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Table 2: Entry modes and average tariffs by industry, 1987-1998
Cross-border Greeneld Average
Industry M&As FDI Tari¤ (%)
Food and beverages 15 6 12.1
Textile, apparel and leather 2 3 15.2
Furniture 4 1 13.9
Wood and wood products 10 2 7.4
Paper and paper products 38 6 9.7
Chemicals, plastic, and petroleum 34 16 10.9
Non-metallic mineral products 14 3 9.0
Basic metal 2 1 3.5
Fabricated metal products 67 9 11.0
O¢ ce machines and computers 16 4 7.9
Non-electrical machinery and equipment 22 1 9.0
Electrical machinery, appliances and supplies 34 12 9.8
Professional, scientic, optical products 1 1 8.0
Transport equipment 15 10 7.8
Other manufacturing 6 3
put together by Jon Haveman under the "Ultimate Trade Barrier Catalog".14 It includes
information on tari¤, nontari¤ barriers (NTBs) and trade data at the six-digit HS industry
level for 103 countries. I compute unweighted and weighted averages at the four-digit ISIC
(Rev.3) industry level where the largest share of the a¢ liate production takes place. Then, I
map these gures into the two-digit RIIE industry level by using concordances provided by
the Statistics Sweden. I only report results for the unweighted tari¤ means to maximize the
number of observations in regressions.
I also compute NTBs as a measure of trade barriers for Swedish MNEs. However, the
aggregation of NTBs to two-digit RIIE industry level is very ad hoc since NTB is an indicator
variable pointing out only the existence of a certain type of trade restriction. There is no
information on the extent of its use. As can be expected the regressions using the NTB do
not give any robust results and therefore I do not report them here.
First, I examine the sectoral composition of entry modes. In the dataset, Swedish manu-
facturing MNEs operate in 33 industries. These industries (under 15 broad categories, mostly
consistent with ISIC, Rev.3) are reported in the Appendix. Table 2 presents the number of
cross-border M&As and greeneld FDI along with the average tari¤ levels by these broad
industry categories. Fabricated metal products, chemicals, paper products and electrical
machinery are the sectors with highest foreign entry. These sectors reect the comparative
advantage of Sweden. Beyond that, however, observe that average tari¤ in these industries
14 I am indebted to Jon Haveman for his work on trade barriers. See
http://r0.unctad.org/trains_new/index.shtm for information on the UNCTAD TRAINS database and
http://www.eiit.org/Resources.html for detailed information on the Ultimate Trade Barrier Catalog.
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Table 3: The sample of countries, 1987-1998
Average Distance No. of
Tari¤ 1000 rms No. of No. of
Country % km 1998 A G
Germany
UK
USA
Denmark
Poland
France
Finland
Netherlands
Spain
Italy
5.8
5.8
4.3
5.8
10.5
5.8
5.7
5.8
5.8
5.8
1.119
1.436
6.336
0.523
0.810
1.546
0.400
1.128
2.595
1.653
28
26
26
25
21
20
18
16
15
15
41
28
29
29
4
16
16
12
9
20
11
4
6
3
10
6
7
0
1
3
Norway
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Austria
China
India
Mexico
Australia
Hungary
Russia
5.5
5.8
17.5
8.5
8.6
34.2
29.5
15.2
9.1
9.7
11.4
0.417
1.285
10.904
6.345
1.244
7.788
6.765
9.603
15.588
1.319
1.227
14
14
12
8
8
8
7
6
4
4
4
16
8
6
4
8
2
3
5
3
4
2
3
1
2
3
3
5
1
1
0
1
2
Malaysia
Japan
Czech Republic
Greece
Portugal
Korea
South Africa
Phillippines
Ireland
Argentina
13.9
16.1
8.2
5.8
5.8
8.5
9.5
20.5
5.8
12.9
9.354
8.193
1.054
2.409
2.992
7.453
9.524
9.341
1.633
12.541
4
4
4
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
0
1
0
1
5
2
1
0
2
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
Thailand
Turkey
Colombia
Taiwan
Indonesia
Slovenia
New Zealand
Chile
Venezuela
Iceland
Israel
23.3
8.9
13.2
9.9
12.3
5.7
6.7
10.9
13.5
4.2
10.1
8.276
2.175
9.691
8.346
10.521
1.494
17.002
13.067
8.724
2.142
1.227
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
are not the highest, which warrants some further exploration.
Table 3 lists all countries included in the sample, their average tari¤ rate, distance from
Sweden, the number of rms producing there in 1998, and the sum of all Swedish M&As and
greeneld FDIs in the sample period. Table 3 does not reveal much about the relationship
between trade costs and form of FDI. The bottom of table shows many countries with very
high tari¤ rates and low levels of Swedish entry. The top part shows low tari¤ rates coupled
with high degrees of M&As. However, this may simply reect that Swedish multinationals
mainly invest in developed European countries which also have lower tari¤ rates and a low
degree of remoteness than the average country.
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Figure 3: Kernel density of Tari¤ by entry modes
Figure 3 shows the kernel density diagram of Tari¤ . The solid line signies cross-border
M&As and the dashed line greeneld FDI. The density of M&As is much higher than green-
eld FDI at lower values of Tari¤ and gets dominated by greeneld FDI at higher values of
Tari¤ . Notice that M&As completely disappear for tari¤ rates greater than 22%. This obser-
vation provides some suggestive evidence for the hypothesis that acquisitions are discouraged
by rising tari¤s.
4.4 Firm characteristics
The model provided in Section 3 is a highly stylized one and its raison dêtre is to provide
a framework for the empirical analysis. The controls used in the regressions hereafter are
inspired both from this simple model and the broader FDI literature.
Firm specic assets. As Markusen (2002) points out, multinationals arise from the use of
knowledge capital, a broad term that includes human capital of employees, patents, blueprints
and procedures, which are called rm specic assets.
Multinationals can reduce their production costs through extensive use of these assets
some of which can be provided to additional plants without reducing their value in existing
plants. I call these mobile assets after Nocke and Yeaple (2007) and use R&D intensity as
a proxy. Mobile is the MNEs total R&D expenditures divided by total sales at the end of
each time period. High-tech rms are more dependent on their own technology creation and
production technology, and as a result are more likely to enter by greeneld FDI. Thus, I
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expect R&D to a¤ect greeneld FDI positively -pointed out by the theory in Section 3 as
well.
Some rm-specic assets, on the other hand, are not moveable and specic to the host
country, such as distribution networks, connections to local bureaucracy, and knowledge of
local business culture. These are called non-mobile assets. Having previous experience in
the host country endows the MNE with these assets; hence, I use a variable called Non-
mobile (the number of the previous a¢ liates of the MNE in the host country) to represent
non-mobile rm-specic assets. There is a well-established international business literature
drawing attention to the di¤erential impact of non-mobile assets on entry modes.15 Previous
experience increases the local knowledge and connections of the MNE and thus may foster
greeneld FDI over cross-border M&As. On the other hand, it may also promote M&As
because experienced MNEs are able to monitor their partners more e¤ectively.16 Therefore,
the expected sign is positive for both entry strategies yet the strength of this e¤ect on each
entry mode is ambiguous.
International experience. A broad international experience fosters FDI by MNEs (Caves,
2007). Following the literature, I measure experience by the number of MNEs foreign a¢ l-
iates around the globe (Noa¤ ) and the total number of employees of the MNE around the
globe (Firmsize). The expected sign for these variables for both entry modes is positive.
However, I expect a stronger positive for cross-border M&As since international experience
is anticipated to boost the bargaining strength and thus the probability of M&As based on
the theoretical framework provided in Section 3.
4.5 Country characteristics
The country-level data are collected from the International Financial Statistics of IMF, the
International Country Risk Group, and the World Development Indicators Database of the
World Bank.
Market size (measured by GDP), infrastructure (measured by telephone mainlines per
one million people,Tel), skill level of the labor force in the host country (measured by the
share of university graduates in the population, Skill), trade openness (share of trade volume
in GDP, Open) are all well-known determinants of entry and are expected to favor both kinds
of entry (Brainard (1997), Carr et al. (2001)).
15See Anderson and Gatignon (1986), Davidson and McFetridge (1984, 1985) and Anand (2002).
16Note that Nonmobile may also represent e¤ects other than non-mobile skills such as the competitive e¤ects
or the bargaining strength. If the MNE already has a¢ liates in the host country, it may not want to hurt
itself by increasing the competition through a new venture and thus may incline more towards M&As which
eliminate rivals.
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GDP per capita is used to account for the availability of acquisition targets in the host
country because it is a broad measure of general level of development. Even though it is
easier to nd sub-contractors and distribution channels in developed countries, which in fact
favors entry, another important issue is that a developed country supplies a bigger number of
more high quality acquisition targets. It is harder to nd suitable acquisition targets in less
developed countries. Therefore, acquisitions are expected to be more favorable in countries
with high GDP/capita.
Not only the tari¤ and transportation costs reductions but also other aspects of liber-
alization that are potentially relevant for FDI and exports should be accounted for. For
example, product market regulations have been liberalized in many OECD countries, and,
more generally, other aspects related to the "cost of doing business" have fallen over time. If
these are correlated with tari¤s (which is likely) this would bias the results. Data from the
World Bank "Doing Business" database is unfortunately only available after 2004. To control
for these aspects of liberalization and also the xed costs greeneld FDI I use International
Country Risk Group index ICRG to measure the general invetment climate, rule of law, and
bureaucracy quality.
Summary statistics and a correlations table are provided in the Appendix.
5 Results
5.1 Cross-border M&As versus greeneld FDI
I begin with the bivariate probit estimates of tari¤ e¤ects on new entry by Swedish multina-
tionals through cross-border M&As and greeneld FDI, because the use of bivariate probit
model provides the benet of being able to calculate the marginal e¤ects for each entry strat-
egy.17 The outside option is no FDI. The rst two columns in Table 4 present the coe¢ cient
estimates whereas the last two columns include the marginal e¤ects of explanatory variables
on the success probability of each strategy. All regressions include a constant, time, country,
and industry xed e¤ects. Wald 2 is 351.2 indicating a good t. Correlation coe¢ cient  is
signicant revealing that A and G are not independent from each other as strategies.
Tari¤ is signicant and negative in equation A (column 1) and positive yet insignicant
17The computationally cumbersome multivariate probit model module written by Capellari and Jenkins
(2003) in STATA does not involve marginal e¤ects computations. Capellari and Jenkins (2003) present
a comparison of bivariate probit (maximum likelihood estimation) to their multivariate probit (simulated
maximum likelihood estimation) analysis and come to a conclusion that as long as the number of random
draws and the sample size are large enough the two methods yield very similar predictions. Since these two
conditions are satised in the estimations in this paper, I use bivariate probit estimation to give a avor of
the economic size of the estimates.
20
Table 4: Bivariate probit
Tari¤
Estimates Marginal e¤ects
Entry mode A G A G
Tari¤
-2.15**
(0.955)
0.160
(1.20)
-0.107**
(0.046)
0.002
(0.018)
Mobile
-3.63**
(1.432)
4.089***
(1.32)
-0.181**
(0.071)
0.062***
(0.021)
Nonmobile
0.105**
(0.044)
-0.174*
(0.103)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.003*
(0.002)
Firmsize
0.008***
(0.003)
0.009***
(0.003)
0.0004***
(0.0001)
0.0001***
(0.00006)
Noa¤
0.016***
(0.002)
0.010***
(0.003)
0.0007***
(0.0001)
0.0001***
(0.00005)
GDP
0.081***
(0.029)
0.048
(0.044)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.0007
(0.0007)
GDP/capita
0.011
(0.009)
0.008
(0.013)
0.0005
(0.0004)
0.0001
(0.0002)
Open
-0.139
0.168
-0.492*
(0.294)
-0.006
(0.008)
-0.008*
(0.005)
Tel
1.282*
(0.749)
-0.069
(1.12)
0.064*
(0.037)
-0.001
(0.017)
ICRG
0.083*
(0.050)
0.155**
(0.075)
0.004*
(0.002)
0.002**
(0.001)
Skill
0.203***
(0.055)
0.111
(0.083)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.002
(0.001)
Observations 5589
Wald 2 351.2
Succes prob. 0.02 0.005
 0.681 0.002
LR test of 8.49
indep. of eq. (0.004)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively; all regressions include a
constant, time, country, and industry xed e¤ects.
in equation G (column 2), revealing that falling trade costs encourage cross-border M&As by
Swedish multinationals. This signicant and negative tari¤ e¤ect is a new result.
Previously in the literature, researchers generally have found a signicant positive e¤ect
of trade costs on multinational entry without di¤erentiating between di¤erent entry modes
using aggregate data.18 Among recent studies are Hijzen et al (2008) and Breinlich (2008)
who investigate cross-border M&As in depth. Both concentrate on the number of M&As in
an industry, whereas I use a single rms choice of M&As or greeneld FDI as my starting
point. The former nd that the impact of bilateral trade costs is less negative or even positive
the higher the share of horizontal mergers is in total mergers. They interpret this as tari¤-
18See Blonigen et al. (2003) for a recent review of this literature.
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jumping motivations playing some role in explaining horizontal mergers. The latter nds no
robust evidence of the e¤ects of tari¤ reductions in the cross-border M&A activity.
Bivariate probit results indicate that trade costs have an adverse e¤ect on the probability
of cross-border M&As and a positive but insignicant e¤ect on greeneld FDI. This might
be the case when the MNEs tari¤-jump with G but not A. Since this result is not signicant,
this interpretation might be a long shot, yet the result for A is strikingly di¤erent from the
previous literature providing some evidence for the IO view. Falling tari¤s make acquisition
targets less expensive and thus increase the likelihood of cross-border M&As.
Calculating the marginal e¤ects shows that an innitesimal increase in Tari¤ reduces
the probability of a cross-border M&A by 10.7%. Although this is not large in absolute
magnitude, compared to the probability evaluated at the sample mean of 2% (given as success
probability in the bottom of Table 4), this is nevertheless economically meaningful.
Turning to other coe¢ cient estimates in the rst two columns of Table 4, size of the MNE
(Firmsize), international experience (Noa¤ ), market size (GDP) and labor skill in the host
country (Skill) increase the likelihood of both kinds of entry. All of these have relatively
small marginal e¤ects on the mode of entry.
Mobile skills of the multinational (Mobile) signicantly reduces the likelihood of A with
a marginal e¤ect of -18.1%. As expected, Mobile increases the odds in favor of G with a
marginal e¤ect of 6.2%. Non-mobile assets (Nonmobile) measured as the number of previous
a¢ liates in the host country have no e¤ect on probability of greeneld FDI; however, they
signicantly increase the likelihood of M&As. While the availability of acquisition targets
and the host country infrastructure proxied respectively by GDP/capita and Tel increase
the odds in favor of M&As, investment climate (ICRG) in the host country increases the
likelihood of GF.
5.2 Exporting versus cross-border M&As versus greeneld FDI
Table 5 reports the multivariate probit estimates of e¤ects of trade costs on the probability
of conducting A, G or E. The rst three columns report the specication with Tari¤ as the
trade cost measure, whereas the last three columns present results using Distance. Wald 2
for the rst specication is 1325 and for the second is 1969 indicating a good t. Notice that
the number of observations is smaller than the bivariate probit estimation. This is because
the RIIE survey supplies the surveyee with a limited number of countries to choose from
when asking about the exports of the parent rms in Sweden.
Also notice that the correlation coe¢ cient between A and G AG is insignicant, whereas
that between A and E AE and G and E GE , are both signicantly di¤erent from zero.
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Table 5: Multivariate probit
Tari¤ Distance
Entry mode A G E A G E
Tari¤ -2.30***(0.918)
0.169
(1.19)
-2.17***
(0.345)
Distance -0.125***(0.017)
-0.100***
(0.025)
-0.069***
(0.005)
Mobile -4.13***(1.36)
3.43**
(1.36)
7.53***
(0.671)
-1.61
(1.04)
3.01***
(0.987)
6.11***
(0.453)
Nonmobile 0.092**(0.048)
-0.180*
(0.094)
0.065*
(0.037)
0.061*
(0.032)
-0.160**
(0.075)
-0.109***
(0.024)
Firmsize 0.004(0.003)
0.007*
(0.003)
0.012***
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.004
(0.003)
0.012***
(0.001)
Noa¤ 0.015***(0.003)
0.0012***
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.018***
(0.002)
0.006*
(0.003)
0.002*
(0.001)
GDP 0.080***(0.029)
0.055
(0.045)
-0.054***
(0.015)
0.093***
(0.027)
0.060
(0.004)
-0.031**
(0.013)
GDP/capita 0.007(0.009)
0.004
(0.014)
0.033***
(0.004)
0.004
(0.008)
0.005
(0.012)
0.022***
(0.003)
Open -0.012(0.163)
-0.406
(0.297)
-0.261***
(0.073)
-0.591***
(0.165)
-0.853***
(0.276)
-0.507***
(0.067)
Tel 1.11(0.705)
-0.039
(1.09)
1.24***
(0.312)
1.72**
(0.716)
2.43*
(1.15)
-0.061
(0.295)
ICRG 0.067(0.049)
0.132*
(0.075)
0.046*
(0.023)
0.133***
(0.041)
0.174***
(0.056)
0.096***
(0.018)
Skill 0.149***(0.052)
0.092
(0.081)
-0.136***
(0.023)
0.094*
(0.05)
0.078
(0.085)
0.057***
(0.022)
Time e¤ects
Country e¤ects
Industry e¤ects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Observations 5589 7805
Wald 2 1325 1969
Correlation.
AG
0.121
(0.083)
0.144**
(0.073)
AE
-0.745***
(0.032)
-0.717***
(0.029)
GE
-0.426***
(0.060)
-0.422***
(0.053)
LR test of 395 445
indep. of eq. (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level,respectively; all regressions include a constant, time, country, and industry xed e¤ects. Country
e¤ects are not used in the last specication since Distance is time invariant.
This suggests a nested structure where rst the decision of foreign entry is made and then
the mode of entry is chosen. However, as stated earlier, the use of a nested logit models is
impossible due to the lack of choice specic attributes in the dataset.
In Table 5, in line with Hypothesis 1 and the main conjecture from the IO view, the
variable of interest, Tari¤ , decreases the likelihood of cross-border M&As. The odds of E
also declines in Tari¤ , which suggests that cross-border M&As and exporting are complements
rather than substitutes as discussed in Neary (2007). It is worth recognizing that although
it is not signicant, Tari¤ carries the traditional theory predicted positive coe¢ cient in
equation G in column 2.
When Distance is used as a measure of trade costs it is observed that all foreign expansion
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Table 6: Multivariate probit, quadratic
Tari¤ Distance
Entry mode A G E A G E
Tari¤ 8.16***(3.15)
1.02
(2.62)
-4.21***
(0.577)
Tari¤ Tari¤ -58.3***(18.1)
-3.51
(-0.40)
4.96***
(1.05)
Distance -0.276***(0.045)
-0.105
(0.072)
-0.240***
(0.017)
DistanceDistance 0.012***(0.003)
0.0008
(0.005)
0.011***
(0.001)
Time e¤ects
Country e¤ects
Industry e¤ects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Observations 5589 7805
Wald 2 1355 2048
Correlation.
AG
0.121
(0.082)
0.144**
(0.073)
AE
-0.752***
(0.032)
-0.724***
(0.029)
GE
-0.427***
(0.059)
-0.424***
(0.053)
LR test of 399 456
indep. of eq. (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level,respectively; all regressions include a constant, time, country, and industry
xed e¤ects. Country e¤ects are not used in the last specication since Distance is time
invariant. All specications include the same controls as in Table 5.
strategies decline in trade costs. It is probably because distance is not only a measure of
transportation costs but also a measure of degree of information transfers, establishment of
trust and cultural di¤erence across countries.
Most of the other covariates exhibit their expected signs, though some are insignicant.
Throughout almost all equations Firmsize and Noa¤ have signicant positive signs, pointing
out that Swedish MNEs with bigger size and more market experience have a higher chance
of entering new markets to serve those markets. In short, international experience matters.
While Nonmobile always favors cross-border M&As, Mobile increases the odds of G. This
suggest that Swedish MNEs endowed with higher levels of non-mobile assets such as connec-
tions to local bureaucracy or knowledge of local business culture prefer cross-border M&As to
greeneld FDI. On the other hand, Swedish MNEs with abundant mobile assets such as blue-
prints, copyrights or product novelty favor greeneld FDI. GDP/capita signifying the level of
host country development and thus the availability of quality acquisition targets, matters for
cross-border M&As but not for greeneld FDI. A better business climate in the host country
ICRG improves the odds in favor of GF. A skilled labor force in the host country (Skill)
increases the likelihood of A more compared to G.
Next, I turn to multivariate probit estimations with a quadratic trade cost term to account
for possible nonlinearities, which are presented in Table 6. Both specications include the
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Table 7: Multivariate probit, interactions
Pooled sample
Experience Firm size No. of a¢ liates
Entry mode A G E A G E
Tari¤ -3.39***(1.03)
1.28
(1.50)
-2.56***
(0.364)
-2.68***
(0.996)
0.848
(1.41)
-2.86***
(0.378)
Tari¤ Experience 0.102**(0.041)
-0.079
(0.081)
0.107***
(0.028)
0.016
(0.031)
0.036
(0.034)
0.115***
(0.024)
Distance -0.169***(0.021)
-0.109***
(0.026)
-0.075***
(0.005)
-0.191***
(0.024)
-0.107***
(0.026)
-0.074***
(0.005)
DistanceExperience 0.001***(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0004)
0.001***
(0.0002)
0.0015***
(0.0003)
0.0002
(0.0004)
0.056***
(0.022)
Western Europe sample
Experience Firm size No. of a¢ liates
Entry mode A G E A G E
Tari¤ -3.11***(1.11)
0.906
(1.71)
-4.16***
(0.511)
-3.04***
(1.13)
1.12
(1.79)
-4.54***
(0.534)
Tari¤ Experience 0.223***(0.073)
-0.040
(0.110)
0.138**
(0.068)
0.152**
(0.068)
0.001
(0.125)
0.219***
(0.068)
Distance -0.267***(0.035)
-0.251***
(0.066)
-0.077***
(0.006)
0.357***
(0.044)
-0.249***
(0.067)
-0.075***
(0.006)
DistanceExperience 0.001***(0.0006)
0.0009
(0.0007)
0.0006***
(0.0002)
0.002***
(0.0005)
0.012
(0.0009)
0.0004***
(0.0002)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level,respectively; all regressions include a constant, time, country, and industry xed e¤ects. Country
e¤ects are not used. All specications include the same controls as in Table 5.
same controls as in Table 5 but not reported here for brevity. Observe that equation A has a
small positive linear and a large negative quadratic Tari¤ term (declining concave), whereas
equation E has a negative linear and a positive quadratic Tari¤ term (declining convex).
At sample means the total e¤ect of tari¤ barriers is negative for both cross-border M&As
and exporting, supporting Hypothesis 1 from the theory. Interestingly though, the adverse
e¤ect of trade costs measured as tari¤s is much stronger for cross-border M&As. In other
words, trade liberalization can induce more cross-border M&As than exporting. This is a
new result. Greeneld FDI still has a positive yet insignicant coe¢ cient. Results using
Distance is similar in equation A and E. Only di¤erence is that Distance does not have a
large negative inuence on greeneld FDI as in the linear specication.
Then, I examine whether trade cost e¤ects vary across di¤erent types of rms to test Hy-
pothesis 2 of the theory.19 To this e¤ect I add the interaction of trade costs with international
experience to the previous specications. I use rm size and number of a¢ liates as proxies for
experience. The top half of Table 7 reports these results for the entire sample. As expected,
the negative impact of trade costs on cross-border M&As and exporting declines with inter-
19 In addition to the ones reported here I also estimated interactions of the trade cost variables with other
controls such as Mobile and Nonmobile using di¤erent cuts of the data (host country development level and
by region). Results are largely consistent.
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national experience. The linear trade cost term (both Tari¤ and Distance) is negative and
signicant and the interaction term is signicantly positive using both Firmsize and Noa¤
as indicators of international experience. This result implies that large rms may not be as
severely a¤ected by trade costs as small rms. Falling trade costs encourage cross-border
M&As conducted by small rms more compared to large rms.
Likewise for number of a¢ liates, as trade costs change Swedish MNEs with a single foreign
a¢ liate are more likely to be severely a¤ected. Multi-a¢ liate MNEs have better and wider
distribution networks around the globe and most importantly more international experience.
Therefore, the M&As conducted by these rms might be less prone to changes in trade costs.
In short, degree of multinationality matter for how profound the e¤ect of trade costs will be
on the mode of entry.
Lastly, I turn my attention to investments in Western European countries as Swedish
MNEs mainly invest in developed European countries which also have lower tari¤ rates than
average country. Swedish MNEs invest in nearby developed countries because they have lots
of potential M&A targets, and these countries just happen to have low trade costs cross-
sectionally. Even though there are country-level regressors to control for level of development
of a country and country xed e¤ects in previous estimations, a more compelling experiment
is to restrict the sample to these nearby countries only to avoid potentially spurious results.
The bottom half of Table 7 reports these results. Notice that results are robust.
6 Conclusion
This paper is an endeavour to nd an answer to the apparent conict between the standard
FDI theory and recent trends. Standard theory predicts less foreign expansion the lower the
trade costs. However, 1990s were an era of rapid trade liberalization and intensely growing
FDI. Standard theory does not di¤erentiate between entry modes whereas newly emerging
IO inspired theories underline asymmetries and heterogeneity inherent in FDI. One such
asymmetry is the di¤erential impact of trade costs on modes of foreign expansion, the central
thrust of the current paper.
In this paper, I attempt to disentangle the tari¤ e¤ects on entry mode decision by carrying
out an empirical analysis with rich, rm-level data on the activities of Swedish MNEs around
the globe in manufacturing sectors from 1987 to 1998. Two hypotheses emerge from a simple
theoretical framework. Cross-border M&As and exporting are encouraged by falling trade
costs and broader international experience dampens the impact of trade costs on entry modes.
The panorama of the results presented in the previous section shows the following: (i)
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There is almost no evidence of tari¤-jumping foreign entry. (ii). Trade liberalization increases
the likelihood of cross-border M&As as conjectured by recent studies. (iii). Cross-border
M&As and exporting respond in the same way to changing tari¤s yet interestingly M&As
are even more severely a¤ected by changes in trade costs than exports. (iv) International
experience dampens the e¤ect of trade costs on the mode of entry.
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Appendix
Table A1: List of industries
RIIE
Code Industry
Manufacture of food and beverage
1.1
1.2
Food manufactures
Beverage manufactures
Textile, apparel, and leather
2.1
2.2
2.3
Textiles
Apparel
Leather and footware
11.3 Furniture
11.2 Wood and wood products (excluding furniture)
Manufacture of paper and paper products
3.1
3.2
4.0
Pulp and paper
Paperboard and ne paper
Paper products
Manufacture of chemicals, plastic products, and petroleum
5.4
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.5
5.6
Petroleum reneries and manufacture products of petroleum and coal
Basic chemicals
Colors, glue, matches and cleansers
Drugs and medicines, pharmaceutical chemicals and botanical products
Rubber products
Plastic products
11.4 Non-metallic mineral products (except products of petroleum and coal)
Basic metal industries
6.1
6.2
Iron and steel basic industries
Non-ferrous metal basic industries
Manufacture of fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipment)
7.1
7.2
7.3
Tools
Metal constructions
Other fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipment)
8.1 O¢ ce machines and computers
Manufacture of non-electrical machinery and equipment
8.2
8.3
Machinery for agriculture and forestry, machine tools and other special machinery
Other non-electrical machinery, weapons, and ammunition
Electrical machinery, apparatus, appliences, and supplies
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
Motors, generators, and transformers
Telecommunication equipment, radio, and TV
Electrical household appliances and supplies
Other electrical machinery and equipment
11.1 Professional, scientic, measuring and controlling equipment, optical products
Manufacture of transport equipment
10.1
10.2
Motor vehicles
Other transport equipment
15.0 Other manufacturing
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